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THE IMPROVEMENT OF JUSTICE WITH THE AID OF
SCIENCE AND EXPERT WITNESSES
ORVILLE RICHARDSONt
I
Just as knowledge is dependent upon qualities of the object
and the observer, so also law is a product of the real and ideal,
object and subject, facts and legal mechanisms. For that reason
law, as knowledge, is relative and characterized by variety, am-
biguity, uncertainty and conflict.
Its doctrines are realistic, objective and factual because they
evolve from decided cases and do not determine them and are
conditioned, therefore, by fact structures in ever-changing and
novel relationships presented for decision., No two fact situa-
tions are equivalent, so that there can be no more identity in
legal relationship than in the flowing space-time world of
modern physics.
Legal precepts are also idealistic and subjective because they
are the end product of the passage of facts through the legal
mechanisms of trial and judicial review. The layman and judge
modify the relationship of facts by superimposed notions of
justice. Thus the law to be declared is dependent in its future
utterance (and what we think it will be is the only law that
matters) upon the unpredictable reasoning, experiences and emo-
tions of jurors and judges. Fallacy, bias and distortion color
the result. It must be plain that these idealistic and subjective
phases of the law's evolution may not be improved upon any truly
scientific basis, and do not concern us in this paper. Justice from
these sources must be improved by raising the level of the morals
of the people, maintaining a judiciary of intelligent, well-trained,
morally circumspect and well-paid men, and electing a legislature
t Member, St. Louis, Missouri Bar.
1. This concept of law is expressed in the classic statement of Mr.
Justice Holmes that "the life of the law has not been logic; it has been ex-
perience," and again that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."
More plainly put by Pollock and Maitland, "The matter of legal science is
not an ideal result of ethical or political analysis; it is the actual result of
facts of human nature and history." THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW xxiii(2nd ed. 1923).
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more obedient to its own conscience and the good of the people
than to the will of lobbyists and voters.
2
Other important cogs in the machinery of decision deal more
closely with fact structures than either the legislature, or
judges: these are the witnesses, attorneys and jurors. We shall
treat only with witnesses, and then with only a small group
known as experts. These are the witnesses specially educated,
trained or experienced in medicine, engineering, physics, hand-
writing, trade and like incidents of our life which modern sci-
ence and enterprise have extended beyond the comprehension of
the average juror. They are frequently called to testify and to
give opinions upon matters which could not otherwise be known
or understood by the jury or judge.
Upon the premise that law evolves from facts, its quality as
"correct" or "just" will vary with the quality of facts presented
as "correct" or "true." The need thus arises for better preserva-
tion, selection, testing, synthesis and presentation or proof of
facts.3 Since the organization of knowledge is the aim of science,
lawyers and courts should be and are inclined to invoke the aid
of science and its men of learning and experience in the process
of gathering and presenting facts in court.4 Without them we
2. This view of law in dualistic jurisprudence has been well stated by
Dr. Hubert W. Smith in his introductory note entitled Interactions of Law
and Science to the symposia mentioned infra, note 3: "The law is both a
reflective and reflected science. If there is anything which needs constant
renovation it is the law. It needs extrinsic criticism to rescue it from his-
torical errors and the obsolescence brought by time. To maintain its
authority in an age of skepticism and science, it must maintain communion
with science and, indeed, with all of life." 24 N.C.L.REV. 104, 105 (1946).
3. The following articles by Dr. Hubert W. Smith, M.D., LL.B., indicate
the need and possibility of bringing law and science into a closer relation-
ship: Components of Proof in Legal Proceedings, 51 YALE L.J. 537 (1942);
The Psychiatrist as a Witness in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 JOURNAL
OF OMAHA MID-WEST CLINICAL SOCIETY 17 (1949); Scientific Proof and
Relations of Law and Medicine, 18 ANN. INT. MED. 450 (1943). In 1943
and 1946, Dr. Smith organized and became editor of two symposium series
on law-science problems with particular reference to law-medicine prob-
lems, published in legal and medical journals throughout the United States.
4. Although medicolegal societies once existed in several of our larger
cities, few may now be found, and with one exception, they are local and
not national in scope. Within the last ten years and chiefly because of the
tireless work of a handful of individuals, interest in improving the rela-
tion between law and science has revived. The First American Medico-
legal Congress was held in St. Louis in January, 1948. As a result of that
meeting the American Academy of Forensic Sciences was formed. An
American Board of Legal Medicine was only recently organized. There are
now over fifty men in the United States holding degrees in both law and
medicine and actively engaged in medicolegal work. Tulane University
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would be forced to rely upon the naive, uncritical, superstitious
and speculative observations of lay witnesses and jurors. In an
ideal system, the scientist and expert witness would be the most
honored of men,5 and upon the supposition that they deal with
immutable laws of the physical world, we would find the jury
largely displaced by them.
However, dissatisfaction with courts has bred a host of ad-
ministrative agencies and tribunals which perform many judicial
functions upon the claim that they alone are able to deal with
technical subjects comprehensible only to specially trained and
expertly advised administrators. Reformers do not stop there.
It is currently popular to support some method of limiting the
choice of experts to a certified panel or to urge the adoption of
some variation of the "Minnesota Plan" under which the legal
and medical profession, acting in concert, undertake to maintain
surveillance over the practice of their numbers and to discipline
them if necessary.6 Some suggest that technical aspects of legal
controversies be decided by experts after hearing other experts.7
In the background are the special interests which for many
years have been willing to abolish the jury system in its entirety.
The millennium promised will not withstand critical analysis.
It may bring with it a larger and more offensive troupe of
abuses than it proposes to banish.
has appointed Dr. Hubert Winston Smith a Research Professor' of Law
and Medicine to extend the work which Dr. Smith began at the Univerity
of Illinois as Professor of Legal Medicine. In February, 1951, Tulane Uni-
versity presented a Short Course on Legal Medicine and Elements of
Medicolegal Litigation over a four day period with almost fifty lecturersfrom all points in the United States and panel discussions participated in
by many lawyers and scientists. Harvard University under the leaderhip
of Dr. Alan R. Moritz has long had a Department of Legal Medicine, and
a few other universities have fairly complete courses in forensic sciences
or legal medicine.
5. Though Mr. Justice Holmes explained the genesis of law on a his-
torical rather than a logical basis, he felt that "an ideal system of law
would draw its postulates and legislative justification from science."
HOLMES, Learning and Science in SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES68 (1918).
6. HAwxNso, The Medical Witness in Court: Expert Testimony/ in
SYMPOSIUM ON MEDICOIEGAL PROBLEMS (1946); ROEMER, Abuses of Medical
Testimony: A Remedy-The Minnesota Experiment, id. at 17-30; Hammes,
Eight Years' Experience with the Control of Medical Testimony-The Min-nesota Plan, 10 JOURNAL OF THE. OMAHA MYID-WEST CLINICAL SOCIETY 13
(1949); Hawkinson, The Pseudo Medical Expert Witness, 10 JOURNAL OF
THE OMAHA MID-WEST CLINICAL SOCIETY 7 (1949).
7. Smith, The Psyehiatdst as a Witness in Civil and Criminal 
Cases,
10 JOURNAL OF THE OMAHA MI-WEST CLINICAL SOCIETY 17 (1949).
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Thus, and on broad grounds, it may be conceded that the
largest repositories of legal uncertainty are those digest key
numbers recording decisions wherein the facts submitted, being
in dispute, were matters for the jury to decide, and whether the
evidentiary facts adduced established the ultimate facts neces-
sary to a cause or defense were questions for the jury and within
its exclusive province to weigh and determine. A general verdict
arrived at behind locked doors may not have been returned after
a finding of the requisite facts. The perfectionist finds this
unsatisfactory because it is possible that extraneous factors
influenced the verdict. But what would be gained by dismissing
the jury, replacing it with other human beings with human ten-
dencies to err and airing a wordy consideration of issues, the
resolution of which will still be in locked chambers, the corridors
of the mind? Moreover, the jury does reach a result and its
methods, though unscientific, are gracefully simple. It decides
controversies without delay. Can judges and administrative
agencies claim as much?8
For another matter, the more scientific, complicated and par-
ticular each trial becomes the further the court will withdraw
from stating broad doctrines, or any at all, useful in shaping
future action either of laymen or lower courts bound to follow
controlling decisions. Without those doctrines, each judicial
opinion isolates itself and promises nothing. It neither instructs
nor offers guidance. It ignores precedent derived from the past,
furnishes no precedent for the future, and merely decides border
disputes of armed antagonists poised for future conflict. The
only certainty is that the more numerous and scientific and com-
plicated the facts become the more inclined the courts have been
8. A simple example is the case of Stephens v. Spuck Iron & Foundry
Co., 358 Mo. 372, 214 S.W.2d 534 (1948), a workmen's compensation case
arising out of an accidental death on November 20, 1946. There was a
hearing before a referee, a review upon the record by the Industrial Com-
mission, a further review in the circuit court and a final review "on the
whole record" in the Missouri Supreme Court under Mo. CONST. ART. V,
§22. The award was paid in December, 1948.
Some nisi prius judges are notoriously slow in handing down rulings in
jury-waived and equity cases or in deciding motions. Some such cases in
Missouri are still under submission in the circuit courts after almost two
years. The Missouri Code compelling a ruling within 90 days after filing
a motion for new trial cuts at only part of the evil. On the other hand,
appellate courts in Missouri are current with their dockets, chiefly because
those courts recognize that justice delayed is justice denied.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss4/3
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to decide issues as a matter of law and without assistance from
the jury.
Moreover, science, though pretending otherwise, still labors
at an infantile level. Although the relativity theory, organismic
biology, Gestalt psychology, psychosomatic medicine and social
economies have made some slight progress in increasing our
understanding of entire relationships, much of science still de-
mands autonomy and isolability, either rejecting or uninterested
in interdependence and functional relationship with other sci-
ences, law and life as a whole. Science still tends to ever-narrow-
ing specialties, and more complex and unintelligible symbols,
words and phrases. Instead of reaching simple, irreducible ele-
ments it finds more variety, diversity and novelty. The deeper it
penetrates into the mysteries of reality, the more complicated be-
come its methods, the more uncertain and conditional become its
results, the more incomprehensible are its explanations, and the
less useful and practical, then, it is to other sciences or laymen
who would use it.
There are other and even more practical reasons for hesitating
to rewire present systems with too much of science and justice
short-circuited through panels of experts. The scientist cannot
surrender his membership in the human race. He often sacri-
fices breadth of understanding in his devotion to science. Some
of the most bigotted, narrow-minded, emotionally unstable and
selfish of men are to be found in hospitals and laboratories. The
quack and charlatan are often the most respected of men in their
own professions; how can courts be expected to detect their true
natures? Before science be intruded too far into the legal
process, we must have some better methods than those now in
use to protect courts from these persons. Reflection will demon-
strate our present inadequacy to cope with a lying expert wit-
ness.
To begin with, it will be recalled that under our system of sub-
mitting disputed facts to the jury, no witness may give his
opinion upon any ultimate fact in issue or upon any evidentiary
fact which the jury is equally capable of finding. Out of neces-
sity opinion evidence and expert witnesses are exceptions to the
rule. The chief characteristic and function of expert witnesses
9. Cf. Cole v. Uhlrnann Grain Co., 340 Mo. 277, 295, 100 S.W.2d 311, 321
(1936).
Washington University Open Scholarship
SCIENCE AND EXPERT WITNESSES
lies in the expression of an opinion upon ultimate facts in issue,
thus invading a province traditionally reserved for the jury. To
that extent he is both witness and juror.
There is little, if any, protection against perjury by an expert.
The four ordinary barriers to that serious crime are the oath,
cross-examination, jury and trial judge. None of these is fully
capable of coping with perjury of an expert. Criminal convic-
tions for perjury are difficult enough to obtain in even the most
flagrant of cases where a witness, either expert or lay, has
falsely stated a fact. It is almost impossible to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a witness has knowingly sworn falsely to
his opinion about a matter. The expert has nothing to fear from
criminal prosecution for violation of his oath.
The cross-examiner, the jury and the trial judge are greatly
handicapped in testing the credibility of experts and the weight
to be given to their evidence. Most of the skilled witnesses en-
countered in courts qualify by graduation from some university
offering professional training and by membership in various
societies and associations of his professional colleagues. In a
sense this is a representation that the university and those soci-
eties have vouched not only for the accuracy of his statements
but for his personal integrity as well. An assault upon him is
reproach to them. Yet few professional schools are interested
in the relation of law to their specialties. Standards of profes-
sional ethics treat with individual relationships and not with
morals or any duty to society. Few professional societies or asso-
ciations deal seriously with the personal morality of their mem-
bers.
The trial judge has little power, and that is seldom exercised,
to declare an expert incompetent as a matter of law.10 Almost
anyone with a title or a diploma or "experience" may pass him-
self off as an expert. Once the testimony is admitted the jury
must appraise it, and the jury may easily be misled by pseudo-
10. Although it is often said that the trial judge has wide discretion in
passing upon the qualifications of an expert and that such discretion will
not be interfered with on appeal unless grossly abused (Stephens v. Kansas
City Gas Co., 354 Mo. 835, 848, 191 S.W.2d 601, 606 (1946), the practical
effect of that rule is to permit trial judges to let almost anyone qualify as
an expert. In the West Digest System under Evidence, key numbers 535 to
546, it is rare to find a case in which one attempting to qualify as an ex-
pert was either rejected as unqualified in the lower court or so ruled .on
appeal.
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scientific jargon, esoteric nonsense, professional hocus-pocus and
polysyllabic mumbo-jumbo. The lawyer has the right to force
the witness to give the facts and reasons upon which his opinions
are based, but even a well-prepared lawyer does not dare to pur-
sue the expert too far into his jungle of learning. He may be
hopelessly enmeshed in details of no real consequence whose sig-
nificance is unknown to the jury. The result is a jaded, restless
panel and either an incomplete examination or one wholly lost
upon its hearers.
Moreover, the sooths these experts say are, supposedly, scien-
tific facts, the product of experience and experiments, truths
developed by empirical methods and not revealed by the faulty
mechanisms of a priori reasoning. The materialistic philosophy
of our scientific age fosters more faith in machines than in men.,.
A scientific fact stated by an expert may be given more credence
than the solemn oath of a layman that such was not the fact.
For all of these reasons, abuses have abounded in the use of
opinion evidence. Experts are hired on a fee basis, and their
opinions, consciously or unconsciously, may be influenced by the
source of their remuneration. Their conclusions are preformed
and foregone; no one at the trial ever knows how many unfavor-
able experts were consulted before the one willing witness was
found. They appear to testify in many cases where direct evi-
dence is available and their testimony is unnecessary. Their opin-
ions are often based upon facts assumed in a hypothetical ques-
tion, itself an instrument of dubious value and subject to much
abuse. In court they are more frequently eager, disputatious ad-
vocates than reserved men of science. Much of their evidence is
uncertain, problematical and conjectural. They are seldom in-
clined to reveal both sides of a controversial matter or facts un-
favorable to their employer or to admit any error of their own.
Most of them feel specially licensed to swear to opinions which
they would not dare expound before their brethren at meetings of
their professional societies. Equal numbers may be employed on
11. Herbert Dingle, a leading British astrophysicist, admitted some
years ago that ". . . The criterion for distinguishing sense from nonsense
has to a large extent been lost; our minds are ready to tolerate any state-
ment, no matter how ridiculous it obviously is, if only it comes from a man
of repute and is accompanied by an array of mathematical symbols.... If
this state of mind exists among men of science, what will be the state of
mind of a public taught to measure the value of an idea in terms of its in-
comprehensibility?"
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either side to reach directly contrary results from the same set
of facts. In the very next case they may be found to have ex-
changed theories and sides of a dispute. A strong suspicion
arises that the sources of their fees are the sole explanations of
their divergence of opinion.
All of these considerations have caused courts and legal com-
mentators of the highest eminence to regard expert evidence
with much distrust, to receive it with much caution, to subject it
to narrow scrutiny, and to accord it very little weight as com-
pared to other types of evidence.1-
II
After the lawyer ruminates a while about the troublesome
problem of finding some working arrangement whereby law and
science may join in developing scientific jurisprudence, he turns
again to the practical problem of using existing methods of
handling expert witnesses and opinion evidence in the trial of
cases then in the file cabinet. So much of that as we now con-
sider may, solely for convenience, be confined to those causes of
action known as the personal injury suit and the workman's
compensation claim. For here there are millions of dollars that
pass annually from insurance companies and utilities to the in-
jured claimant.
It is important to view expert evidence in its proper perspec-
tive in our judicial system and to consider it as a related, rather
than an isolated, part of that process. In a personal injury case
the lawyer must begin and end with a clear understanding of the
cause of action, the facts and witnesses necessary to establish or
defeat it, the nature, character and extent of the injuries and
damages, their causal relation to the act of culpability and the
probability or improbability of a recovery at law. These initial
and key factors in this type of a case follow it at every step and
turn and furnish the central issues which to some extent shape
all action in the case.
The medical witness is a logical, though not always indis-
pensable, actor in the sequence of events from the first reception
of a client to his satisfied final departure. Thus, he may have
12. 20 AM. JuR. 1058-1059 (1939); 32 C.J.S. 393-394, 473-74 (1942);
3 JONES, EVIDENCE, 2391-2393, 2509-2512 (2nd ed. 1926). See: Notes,
12 L.R.A. 457 (1891); 62 L.R.A. 871 (1904).
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only furnished the bandages and a report. But even here he is
at least a potential witness to the facts even if he is only a gen-
eral practitioner without a definite diagnosis or opinion as to
causal relation to trauma or the permanency of the injury.
Necessarily there are certain special rules for the qualification
and examination of medical experts. Whether a witness is qual-
ified as an expert is a question of law for the court, not for the
jury, and is usually one within the court's discretion to decide.13
Practical, and not legal, problems are presented to the attorney
in choosing his expert. In many cases two types of medical wit-
nesses are called: the treating physician and the expert who has
made an examination or attends trial chiefly to render an opinion
by report or testimony.
Examination of the treating physician in court will proceed
along the same line as examination of the expert who has ex-
amined solely for the purpose of testifying. In fact, it is well to
reiterate and remember that the expert witness does not differ
from the ordinary lay witness with one important exception:
experts may give opinions and conclusions in evidence and thus,
for the time, invade the jury's province by testifying to an ulti-
mate fact in issue, whereas the lay witness may not do so.
In the case of an expert employed by an attorney to give an
opinion by report or testimony or both, there is usually some
anti-selection against the other litigant. In almost every large
city, lawyers classify these experts as "plaintiffs' doctors" and
"defendants' doctors," according to that side of these contro-
versies upon which they most frequently appear. Many physi-
cians who examine for insurance companies will refuse to accept
employment by a plaintiff's attorney. There is not much differ-
ence between the findings of these two classes of experts, but
their opinions usually differ, and often quite widely, upon the
cause and permanency of the injury and the percentage of dis-
ability in worknen's compensation cases where such a rating is
requested or permitted by the commission."4
13. Oliver v. City of Vandalia, 28 S.W.2d 1044, 1045 (Mo.App. 1930).
See note 6 supra. Footnotes in this section of the paper are desultory,
incomplete, conflned mostly to Missouri cases and merely illustrative of
hornbook law.
14. It is not unusual in workmen's compensation cases, where a per-
centage rating of disability is required by the commission in order to ren-
der an award, to find estimates in the same case ranging from 5% to 50%
disability or more. The commission often takes an average or quotient
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The "plaintiff's doctor" may become a partisan in the case by
referring the plaintiff to a lawyer, or because of an unpaid bill
or because of a natural interest in his patient. Such matters sug-
gest fields for cross-examination and oral argument. The "de-
fendant's doctor" may develop an interest or bias about which
he may be cross-examined for the obvious reason that he has
been selected by the employer or insurer, and a substantial part
of his livelihood may be dependent upon the continuation of a
favorable relationship and a satisfied client.
Some attorneys probe the medical witness with questions
about the frequency of their appearance in court, whether then
for plaintiff or defendant, how often in cases of the opposing
attorney and the amount of their charges for testifying. How-
ever, where the defendant's attorney does so he exposes his flank
to similar questions by the plaintiff's attorney. Most experienced
trial attorneys avoid these questions since the jury is seldom
impressed with such questions going to interest or bias because
of the awe and respect customarily accorded to any physician by
a layman. Moreover, many jurors believe that it is a mark of
honor that a physician is chosen to participate with lawyers and
jurors in the solution of legal controversies.
Whether in direct or cross-examination, there will usually be
the same general plan and scope of questioning of medical wit-
nesses. To understand that plan the expert may generally be
considered in his four relations to our judicial system: (1)his
relation to his own profession; i.e., his qualifications; (2) his
relation to the attorney in the case; i.e., the manner of his em-
ployment; (3) his relation to the party for whom he is testi-
fying; and (4) his relation to his own oath, his powers of
reasoning and the facts in the case.
Inquiry concerning qualification goes to the witness' compe-
tency and establishes whether and to what extent he is an expert.
Of what school is he a graduate? When? Did he take any special
courses or training after graduation? Has he experience in gen-
eral practice? Is he a specialist? Is he on the staff of local hos-
pitals? Has he done any teaching? To what medical societies
does he belong? All of these questions go to the admissibility of
upon the assumption, perhaps, that the witnesses were biased. As a result
the medical experts tend to widen and not close the gap between their esti-
mates in subsequent cases.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss4/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
his opinions and the weight of his evidence, and are the impor-
tant preliminary subjects of interrogation.
The next series of questions deals with the occasion for his
examination of the plaintiff, and thus may reveal his connection
with the attorney or party for whom he is testifying. At the
same time inquiry is made concerning the frequency and times
of his examination of the patient, thus demonstrating his oppor-
tunity to know the facts which he relates.
Every doctor takes a history from the patient covering the
time and manner of his injury, the time of appearance and
nature of symptoms, the type and frequency of treatment, the
existence or non-existence of disease or former injuries which
may account for the symptoms and the nature of present com-
plaints. Although all of this information is necessary for a diag-
nosis and opinion, none of it, except complaints at the time of
examination, is admissible in favor of the patient because it is
hearsay, although any of it may be admissible against him as
an admission against interest.'5
With one exception, the remaining testimony of the expert
will be governed by general rules applicable to all witnesses.
That exception relates to the hypothetical question, a cumber-
some device fashioned for the sole purpose of eliciting an opinion
and thus peculiar to the testimony of experts. Where possible,
such questions in their usual long, argumentative form should be
avoided. 6 As a general rule, this question should assume suffici-
ent facts upon which the witness may base an intelligent opin-
ion.17 Some facts necessary for an answer may be gleaned from
the expert's own knowledge, but the jury is entitled to know
what facts are relied upon by the witness in answering."' The
question should be so framed as to reflect the theory of the party
propounding it, as shown by facts proved, admitted or to be
15. Evans v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 342 Mo. 420, 116 S.W.2d 8 (1937). There
is no distinction between the treating physician and one who examines
solely for the purpose of testifying. Baunhoer v. McLaughlin, 205 S.W.2d
274, 280 (Mo.App. 1947).
16. In the Tuckerman will contest in Ohio a psychiatrist was asked a
hypothetical question concerning the testator's sanity. The question con-
tained 20,000 words and required three hours to read. The witness an-
swered "I don't know." See: 5 Ohio L. Rep. 45 (1907). The case is note-
worthy not only for the length of the question but also as probably the only
one in which an expert confessed his inability to answer.
17. Roberts v. Woodmen Ace. Co., 233 Mo.App. 1058, 1065, 129 S.W.2d
1053, 1056 (1939).
18. Adams v. Carlo, 101 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Mo.App. 1937).
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later shown in evidence. 9 It must contain sufficient facts to
afford ground for a reasonable conclusion. 20 It should contain a
full and fair recital of all relevant facts bearing on the theory
presented by the questioner,2 1 but it need not embrace the con-
tentions of one's opponent on disputed matters,2 and should not
include the opinions of another expert. 2"
The answers of an expert, where they involve opinions, must
have a sufficient predicate in evidence of his own examination
and must be responsive.24 They should be definite expressions of
opinion and must not be speculative. 25 If they relate to causal
connection or future consequences, such results must be reason-
ably certain to appear, probabilities, and not mere possibilities. 6
Without that certainty the opinion is inadmissible. That is not to
say that statements of mere possibility may not be received in
evidence where preceded or followed by other evidence from
which the jury may determine the reasonable certainty of a
result.27 It is always proper for an expert to give the reasons
for his opinions, but in doing so he may not bring in matters not
properly admissible in evidence and should be confined to the
case at hand without rambling off into a similar case within the
doctor's knowledge. 8
The manner, scope and extent of cross-examination is largely
within the control of the trial judge and subject to his discre-
19 Evans v. Partlow, 322 Mo. 11, 25, 16 S.W.2d 212, 217 (1929).
20. Bennett v. Punton Sanitarium Ass'n., 213 Mo.App. 363, 379, 249
S.W. 666, 672 (1923).
21. Dillard v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 150 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Mo.App.
1941).
22. Zeller v. Wolff-Wilson Drug Co., 51 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo.App. 1932).
23. Aronovitz v. Arky, 219 S.W. 620, 623 (Mo.App. 1920).
24. Lehman v. Knott, 100 Ore. 59, 70, 196 Pac. 476, 479 (1921).
25. The answer should be definite and unequivocal and not hedged by
phrases such as "I think" or "I guess" or "I imagine." Conjecture is not
opinion. Floyd v. McDonald Mfg. Co., 226 Mo.App. 444, 451, 46 S.W.2d
251, 255 (1932).
26. In some cases even probabilities will not suffice. In the leading case
of Kimmie v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 334 Mo. 596, 605, 66
S.W.2d 561, 564 (1933), where the causal relation between trauma and a
cancer was involved, the court said that "even a positive opinion must have
to support it reasons and testimony which will give sufficient probative
force to be substantial evidence."
27. Ibid.
28. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Savage, 31 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1929),
Gulf, W. & P. R. Co. v. Abbott, 146 S.W. 1078 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912. How
can you cross-examine a witness or test his credibility upon some other case
he had in which a similar result ensued? This dodge is the favorite retreat
of a witness without reasons to support his opinions.
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tion.29 Although the hypothetical question presented to the ex-
pert may be rephrased to include additional facts upon which
the cross-examiner relies or to exclude facts which his theory of
the case rejects, it is seldom a satisfactory method of cross-exam-
ination. Better tests of opinon evidence are to show that infer-
ences or opinions are based upon facts not proved, facts inac-
curately or incompletely observed, a lack of specific or general
experience in the particular matter at issue, incorrect reasoning,
and facts mentally added by the witness. In brief, we search the
expert upon the facts, his reasons and his experience.
One important matter in the examination of medical witnesses
is often overlooked: the scope of his examination. It may have
been limited to a physical examination without sufficient labor-
atory tests, and the tests done may have actually been made by a
nurse, assistant or another specialist. The admissibility of such
tests will turn in most cases upon the amount of supervision by
the testifying witness and his presence at one or more important
phases of the test. If the witness is a specialist, close scrutiny
may reveal that he has attempted to extend his testimony into
other fields in which he is not qualified. If the witness is a gen-
eral practitioner, inquiry may reveal that his experience with the
matter at issue has been limited, and that when similar problems
are presented in his medical practice he usually calls in a spe-
cialist.
When the witness comes to detail his findings, positive or neg-
ative, and his conclusions, the crux of his testimony has been
reached. It is the one part of his evidence that will be clearly
understood and easily remembered by the jury. It is the reason
he was employed and the reason all facts were made available to
him. It is the most difficult part of his testimony to shake on
cross-examination because it calls for a conclusion and opinion
arrived at and reported to opposing counsel long before he ever
took the stand.
In a personal injury case the questions propounded during
this last phase of the expert's examination are directed to the
central issues of the cause of action or defense. They are pre-
ceded by legal research and the pleadings, and are followed by
the measure of damages instruction. Therefore, the questions
will search out opinions concerning the nature, character, extent
29. Rath v. Knight, 55 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Mo. 1932).
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and permanency of the injuries, the physical and occupational
disability therefrom, the pain to be expected in the past and
future, the causal relation between the trauma and the injuries,
the necessity for further medical care, and the reasonable value
of medical services rendered and to be rendered.
III
The successful presentation of expert evidence in court in-
volves much more than a native cleverness or general resource-
fulness on the part of the attorney, or the choice of an expert
believed to be favorable to those for whom he testifies. The at-
torney must have a thorough knowledge of the elements of not
only his own side of the case, but also of those of his opponent's
cause of action or defense. The expert should have adequate
time and opportunity to make his examination, to obtain all
necessary laboratory aids to diagnosis, to review reports fur-
nished by others, to know the testimony of those who have pre-
ceded him, to understand the several claims of the parties and
the points of disagreement, to conduct research into obscure or
forgotten medical lore, to discuss the case with the attorney and
then instruct him upon the general nature of the medical ques-
tions which should be asked and the answers to be expected, to
make arrangement for his fee, and to know the approximate
time for his appearance in court. Whenever possible, the attor-
ney should buy or borrow medical books with detail sufficient
not only to acquaint the attorney with some of the technical
phases of the matter, but to use in cross-examination." In im-
portant cases many attorneys conduct their own medical re-
search and make it available to their witnesses.
Recurring once more to the first part of this paper in which
the generally unsatisfactory relation of law with science was
discussed, it should not be supposed that criticism of the past or
existing state of that relationship should discourage all effort to
correct it or all hope of improvement. It has been only half a
century since Mr. Justice Holmes said that "an ideal system of
law should draw its postulates and its legislative justification
from science." Behold the progress in nineteen centuries since
the time when Paul in his first epistle to Timothy warned him
30. Hemmuinghaus v. Ferguson, 358 Mo. 476, 488, 215 S.W.2d 481, 489
(1948).
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to avoid "profane and vain babblings of science so called."
So some progress has been made. Indeed, since that day in 1895
when Mr. Justice Holmes spoke so bravely and so well, other
figures have appeared with brighter dreams of improving the
administration of justice by science and expert witnesses. It is
entirely proper that we listen to the honeyed words of a modern
prophet who tells us:
In the age of Scientific Jurisprudence, law will gain new
authority by deriving its rules and statutes from social data
carefully collected; it will welcome illumination from cog-
nate fields of learning to guide its formation of value judg-
ments; historical rules will be put to the test of current
utility; the pure introspectionist will have to move over for
the inductive scholar and the functionalist; psychiatric crim-
inology will lead to radical reform of our criminal law;
behavior problems will be studied in law schools and a new
type of lawyer will appear on the scene, trained to function
as a social clinician. Law will aid men of medicine and of
science to extend the social effects of their discoveries, to
eradicate certain diseases, to help cure the widespread dis-
turbances of physical and mental health which now spring
from socio-economic maladjustments. Between law and
science the whole fabric of society may be spun anew.
These vital cooperations must be nurtured by joint pro-
grams of law schools and medical schools; by purposeful
cooperation of physician and scientist with members of the
bar and bench. In the medical college the old lectures in
medical jurisprudence must give way to an audacious pro-
gram in Legal, Social and Industrial Medicine dedicated to
systematic study of socio-legal-economico-scientific prob-
lems.
The time is gone when law and science might continue to
expand their authority while pursuing mainly a course of
intellectual isolationism. The survival and security of man,
and his hopes of happiness, depend upon the successful quest
of social synthesis."
31. Smith, Interactions of Law and Science, 24 N.C.L. Rev. 104 (1946).
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